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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 19/05/2006

Accident number: 313

Accident time: 10:20

Accident Date: 07/07/2000

Where it occurred: Lurio River Bridge,
(Cabo Delgado)

Country: Mozambique

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment
(?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: 08/07/2000

ID original source: GZ/AVS2001:MZ02

Name of source: HT (field): IND 133

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: PMN AP blast

Ground condition: bridge and surrounds
metal scrap
route (verge)
trees

Date record created: 20/02/2004

Date last modified: 29/02/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude: 39° 50' 62" E

Latitude: 13° 40' 89" S

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate metal-detector (?)
inadequate medical provision (?)
inadequate area marking (?)
inadequate equipment (?)
disciplinary action against victim (?)
handtool may have increased injury (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
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use of pick (?)

Accident report
The national MAC made available a summarised accident report during 2002. Their accident
report is dated 14/07/00 and followed a MAC site visit made on 13/07/00. That report referred
to an attachment which was the demining NGO’s internal investigation. The demining NGO
involved had made available their internal investigation report during 2001. The report is
reproduced in full below, edited for anonymity.

1. General
1.1 Ponte Rio Lurio is at the border between Nampula and Cabo Delgado provinces, and
carries the main Nampula/Pemba road across the Rio Lurio. This is the only major road link
between the two provinces, and is a natural focal point for both travellers and the local
population trying to access the river banks for farming and the river itself for water. During the
Civil War extensive fenced minefields were laid by FRELIMO around the ends of the bridge in
an attempt to deter sabotage attempts by RENAMO on the bridge structure itself. The mines
now border the main road and extend to within metres of occupied housing and machambas.
They currently threaten the local population and have caused both human and animal
casualties during the recent past.
1.2 Initial clearance was conducted on the southern side of the bridge during 1997/98, as the
2nd priority task on the Nampula PPWP. The task was suspended after 20,107 square metres
of ground had been cleared of 47 Soviet PMN AP blast mines, 76 Portuguese M966 AG
mines and four mixed items of UXO. Phase 2 work began on the Northern, Cabo Delgado,
side of the bridge when Team 7 deployed on the task on 10th May 2000. The task is priority 8
on the Cabo Delgado PPWP, and is expected to have similar impact as the previous work on
the opposite river bank. On 7th July 2000 work was halted after a deminer accidentally
detonated an explosive device whilst working in his lane.
1.3 An internal accident investigation was conducted over 7/8th July 2000. The following
personnel were involved: Mozambique Country Manager, Cabo Delgado/Niassa Programme
Manager, Zambezia Programme Manager.
1.4 As well as a detailed scrutiny of the accident site, interviews were conducted with the
following personnel: Team 7 Supervisor, Trainee Assistant Supervisor, Team 7 Medic, Team
7 Deminer – Victim, Team 7 Deminer – witness adjacent lane, Team 7 Deminer – witness
Adjacent lane.
1.5 A representative of the IND [MAC] conducted a separate visit to the accident site on 13th
July 2000. He was briefed on the details of the accident by the Team 7 Supervisor.

2. Events leading to the accident
2.1 Team 7 began work on the Northern, Cabo Delgado, side of the bridge on 10th May
2000. The soil around the bridge has a medium laterite content necessitating clearance by the
use of a combination of detector and excavation. It was strongly suspected that the main
minefield would be marked by a barbed-wire perimeter fence (as was previously found on the
Nampula side of the bridge). The plan was to use 2m wide breach lanes to locate the wire,
after which full clearance was to be conducted.
2.2 The team were all made fully aware of threat from both AP and AG mines, and by 7th
July two M969, one POMZ-2 and six OZM-4 had been safely located and destroyed. The AP
mines were located close to the main road and outside the wire, whilst the AG mines were
found following in a line up the middle of 2 distinct barbed-wire obstacles running along the
ground and spaced a approximately 1m apart. This means that a total of five different types of
mine have so far been located around the bridge (OZM-4, M966, POMZ-2, PMN, M969).
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2.3 Clearance in lane 7 had reached the barbed-wire perimeter, which consisted of two
distinct parallel lines of barbed-wire running 1m apart. Each line was made up of between one
and four strands of wire grouped together. At some points some strands of the wire were
missing or displaced, but a general pattern was thought to be emerging. By the time 26m of
parallel wire in lane 7 had been investigated, two OZM-4 bounding mines had been located
(see detailed sketch map at Annex B) [Not made available]. In both cases trip wires had been
attached to the barbed-wire and then anchored off.
2.4 On 7th July 2000, the victim was continuing his clearance along the wire. He later stated
that he used the combination method to clear a lane 5m down the left side. The ground here
runs down in a 1:8 slope towards a large tree. On reaching the tree, the victim stopped where
he could see a distinct change in the condition and the direction of the wire. The victim later
maintained that both the Team Supervisor and the Trainee Assistant Supervisor then advised
that he should widen the lane to 2m by clearing along the right line of wire. The victim also
maintained that the Team Supervisor completed a 5m check before he moved to work in the
right side lane. The victim obviously started this work, but could not explain why he did not
move any of his equipment over from the left lane into his new lane. He did, however,
remember moving the blue and yellow check sticks to the back of the lane before starting
work (see detailed sketch map at Annex B). The victim started work in the new lane and
removed a metal bracket and piece of the barbed-wire. He then did a further two check
sweeps with his detector before starting excavation with his enxada (digging tool, [hoe]). On
the 3rd scrape (moving from left to right) an unplanned explosion occurred which threw the
victim directly backwards into the safe area behind.

3. Treatment of the casualty and subsequent evacuation
3.1 On hearing the unplanned explosion, the two deminers from adjacent lanes collected the
stretcher from the medical point and moved into the victim’s lane to recover the casualty. The
medic waited at the top end of the lane and did not enter the minefield. On hearing the
explosion the Team Supervisor states that he radioed from his position at the other side of the
minefield that demining should stop. Meanwhile the two deminers now in the victim’s lane
reached the casualty. They both remember seeing a cloud of white smoke still hanging in the
air around and on top of the lower legs of the victim, who was lying on his back. The victim
was recovered to the stretcher before being moved out of the demining lane. The Team
Supervisor and the medic met the victim at the start of the lane where they began assessing
the nature of his injuries.
3.2 The second medic was quickly moved from the Control Point (CP) to the victim in the
team vehicle along the track running to the rear of the demining lanes. Both medics then
began giving first aid as follows:
Cleaned and dressed wounds to left hand and lower face.
Inserted a cannula, set up an IV giving set and began to administer 500ml of Ringers solution.
Administered 10mg of Nubain (pain relief drug) via the cannula.
Administered 10ml of Crystapen (liquid antibiotic) via the cannula.
3.3 By 10:45 hours the victim had been loaded into the recovery vehicle. Also by this time the
initial accident report radioed to headquarters at 10:25 had been assessed by the Country
Manager. It was decided that due to the victim’s condition (reported as stable) it would be
more beneficial to move him directly to Nampula main hospital rather than to Pemba, as was
in the team plan. This decision was largely taken because one of the group’s ambulances,
that could speed up the recovery time, was known to be ready to move from HQ. The group’s
Mozambique ambulances had recently been governed up to 80kph, which is 15kph faster
than the group’s normal speed-limited vehicles.
3.4 The team vehicle, with the victim on board, met the ambulance at 12:47at Nateke. The
victim was quickly transferred to the ambulance where his condition was again assessed as
stable by the Chief Medic who had deployed with the ambulance. The ambulance then
returned to Nampula, arriving at the hospital at 14:25.
3.5 The victim was quickly handed over to the “accident and emergency department” where
one of the demining group’s Hospital Bags [of essential hospital consumables] was made
available. From this point onwards it is considered that no adequate attention was given to the
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casualty by the hospital staff; No doctor was on hand to examine the victim’s injuries - Rather,
an examination was made by a hospital medic who simply dismissed the injuries as not
urgent and transferred the victim to a “post operative ward”. Thus any possible repair work,
such as stitching, that could have aided the victim’s recovery was not carried out (see
conclusion). The hospital doctor did eventually see the victim the next morning.
3.6 An expatriate doctor was able to look at the victim’s injuries and give a second opinion
on 13th July 2000 (see Annex F).

4. The accident investigation
4.1 The demining group’s internal accident investigation took place on Friday and Saturday
7/8th July 2000. This involved a study of the site and on-site interviews by Mozambique
Programme Managers on the day of the accident, and a further detailed site visit and
interview with the victim the following day.
4.2

The investigation revealed that;

The deminer’s injuries were caused by a Soviet PMN anti personnel blast mine which he had
struck with his enxada whilst excavating at the front of his lane. The fragmentation found,
together with the size and position of the crater, indicate that the mine was laid 15-20cm
below the surface, in a conventionally horizontal manner (see photographs at Annex C [not
made available]).
The deminer was saved from serious life threatening injury by his safety equipment; In
particular his visor which was found to be shattered and scattered in all directions. The visor
headband and a head scarf were found high in trees well to the rear of the seat of the
explosion (see diagram photographs at Annexes B and C). No significant damage was found
on his protective vest.
Injuries to the deminer’s lower face were caused by the pieces of visor which he had been
wearing in the correct manner. The injuries to his left hand were caused by the shattered
wooden handle of his enxada which he was using to excavate with. A small point of
contention is that the original accident report stated that the casualty had sustained injuries to
his right hand rather than those actually to his left. Minor cuts and grazing to his left ankle and
upper right arm were caused by secondary fragmentation (soil and stones) from the blast
effect of the mine.
The group’s Standard Operating Procedures had been broken by the deminer and both
supervisory staff.
The deminer did not re-align his lane markers and tools before starting work in the eventual
accident lane. An inadequate number of detector sweeps were made by the deminer before
he started excavating with his enxada just prior to detonating the mine.
It is not absolutely clear what ground had been checked by the supervisory staff because the
blue and yellow check sticks had been moved to the rear of the lane by the deminer before he
started work in the accident lane. Three different explanations of what checks had been
carried out were given by those involved.
Professional treatment of the victim and well coordinated medevac drills were not adequately
followed up by Nampula hospital staff. The demining group’s staff had to harass disinterested
hospital staff to call in the duty doctor. A Russian doctor did finally examine the victim the day
after the accident had occurred.

5. Conclusions in relation to the accident
5.1 Based on the evidence gained from interviews, consideration of the accident
circumstances, and detailed assessment of the site, the following conclusions are drawn:
•

Complacency and slack demining are indirectly the most likely cause of the
accident. A contributing factor to this would appear to be a lack of control
through the non imposition of rigid 5m and daily checks by the supervisor and
assistant supervisor. The fact that a deminer has been allowed to move
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check sticks also points to a lack of general minefield discipline. No direct
reason for missing the signal from a relatively high metal content AP mine
can be established. The victim was demining along a confirmed line of mines
and should have been more aware of danger.
•

The shattering effect on the victim’s visor may well have been caused by a
large piece of his enxada blade which was taken off by the blast. It may have
struck the visor and caused the shattering, before itself being deflected away
(it should be noted that shattering of the visor is not a usual occurrence). Had
the victim’s visor not been worn correctly then it is likely that his facial injuries
would have been far more serious than the small cuts and grazes that he
actually sustained.

•

The well conducted initial treatment of the casualty, relatively fast casevac,
hospital pre-warning and supply of the group’s hospital bag would have been
of little consequence had the victim’s injuries been more serious. This is
because the hospital staff were not ready or particularly concerned. Casevac
needs to be followed up by timely and appropriate action by the hospital. The
demining group’s HQ staff need to make sure that a doctor has seen the
victim and given a clear diagnosis of the extent of the injuries, and that
subsequent treatment is being given. Treatment should not be left in the
hands of disinterested local hospital staff.

6. Summary actions
6.1 Demining should continue only after all teams have carried out retraining on the
combination method of detection. (Completed 10th July 2000)
6.2 Provisional Operations Managers (POMs) are to ensure that the 5m check system is
understood and carried out by all demining teams. 5m checks must be carried out by the
assistant supervisor before a deminer can move on (marked with yellow stick). Team
supervisors must have completed a check of all clearance conducted by the end of a working
day (marked with blue stick). Deminers should only move sticks 1m back, or to one side, out
of the way if they are restricting work.
6.3 Disciplinary action is to be taken against the Team Supervisor, Assistant Supervisor and
the victim for a lack of minefield discipline.
6.4 The team working at the Lurio task is to be issued with Ebinger 420 GC’s (Ground
Compensating) detectors in order to help with clearance.
6.5 The provincial heath administrator is to be informed of the failure of Nampula hospital to
supply adequate medical attention. A clearer demining accident system is to be found. If
possible the NGO’s Mozambique organization should look into finding a qualified locally
practicing doctor who can be on call for any emergencies. If necessary a form of payment
should also be considered. [A named ex-pat doctor] (or other approved doctor) should
approve selection of local doctor(s) on the next medical visit.
6.6 The shattered pieces of the victim’s visor should be collected during subsequent
clearance and sent to the group’s HQ in UK for possible testing by the manufacturer.
Signed: Country Manager, Mozambique
Annexes referenced in the report were not made available.
The demining NGO were operating in one-man-teams, with the enhanced levels of
supervision that this entails. They routinely squat or kneel to excavate. The group always
wears a full-face visor and a short frontal apron when in mined areas.
An IND report was made available, but could not be copied. The accident code was
000929/Code 071. The map reference was recorded as: Lat: 13 deg 40' 89”S Long: 39 deg
50' 62”E
The report included little detail, referring the reader to the internal accident report above. The
only aditional infromation was that equipment worth US$50 was damaged.
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Victim Report
Victim number: 395

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: 4 hours 5 minutes

Protection issued: Long visor

Protection used: Long visor, Short
frontal vest

Short frontal vest

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Arm
minor Face
minor Leg
severe Hand
COMMENT
See medical report.

Medical report
No formal medical report was made available.

The photograph of the victim’s hand shown above was made available.
The field medics reported giving first aid as follows:
Cleaned and dressed wounds to left hand and lower face.
Inserted a cannula, set up an IV giving set and began to administer 500ml of Ringers solution.
Administered 10mg of Nubain (pain relief drug) via the cannula.
Administered 10ml of Crystapen (liquid antibiotic) via the cannula.
The accident occurred at 10:20 and the ambulance arrived at the hospital at 14:25.
The hospital doctor eventually saw the victim the next morning.
The victim suffered minor cuts and abrasions to the face and damage to his hand, leg and
arm.
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Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because it seems
that the victim was working in breach of his SOPs and his errors were not corrected. The
secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate equipment” because the methods used and
equipment available were not appropriate, and the provision of appropriate equipment from
detector to ambulance is a management responsibility.
The detector in use was not suitable for use in mineralised soil (as recognized by the decision
to use ground-compensating detectors in the internal report) and the quality of the enxada
was poor because it broke up in the accident.
The use of some kind of pick-axe or hoe is not unusual when conducting area-excavation.
The tool is swung in at a low angle and used to shave the face of the excavation in a slow
advance. This is the third of three accidents involving this demining NGO and an enxada in
Mozambique. See the accidents on 14th April 1998 and on 7th June 2000.

A photograph of an enxada is shown above. Locally made, the quality of steel and handle is
very variable.
While the use of the tool may be accepted, the quality of the tool being used was clearly
inadequate. Hardened steels will crack and shatter in a blast, which appears to have
happened in this case. If the blade and the handle were made as one using a medium grade
of steel, the tool would be far less likely to shatter and cause injuries – as it apparently did in
this case.
The failure of the group’s management to provide an on-site ambulance is most surprising.
The victim was evacuated in the Team vehicle and driven over bad roads for two hours before
meeting an ambulance coming the other way. After a further hour and a half, the victim
arrived in hospital where he was not examined by a doctor until the next day.
The internal investigating team recognized that the performance of the hospital was
unacceptable but did not acknowledge that the group’s failure to provide a dedicated on-site
ambulance was “unusual” to the point of being almost unique amongst professional groups in
Humanitarian Demining.
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